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Abstract 
Biologists and eco110111ists l1ave arralyzed populations wl1ere each i11cliv"idhu,,,ad-l-linnt1ote·=�-----­
with randomly selected individuals. The random matching generates a very complicated 
stochastic system. Consequently evolutionary biologists have approximated such a sys-
tem by a deterministic system. The justification of such an approximation is that the 
population is assumed to be very large and thus some law of large numbers must hold. 
In this paper we give an example for which this assumption does not hold. We then show 
that if we assume that the population is infinite then the stochastic and the deterministic 
system are the same. Finally, we show that if the process lasts finitely many periods and 
if the population is large enough then the deterministic model offers a good approxima-
tion of the stochastic model. In doing so we make precise what we mean by population, 
matching process, and evolution of the population. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a large literature (see below) that studies dynamical system with individuals 
randomly matched in pairs, although the particular way with which people are matched 
is left unspecified. In this paper we describe ways oi matching individuals and the 
properties of such matching schemes. �����ef-sttc-h-mat-ehittg-�teHTe&���������������������������-
Fudenberg and Levine (1990) examine a model where there are n populations; each
population consists of m different types where each type consists of a belief over what
strategy the other individuals adopt. The proportion of population i that is of type j is 
denoted by PiJ. Every period each player from a population i is randomly and indepen­
dently matched with one individual from every other population i' ( i' # i). Fudenberg 
and Levine assume that the probability with which a player meets a player from popu­
lation i' and of type j is Pi'j· The randomly matched individuals play a game selecting
strategies according to their beliefs and updating their beliefs according to the observed 
strategy choices of the other players. Fudenberg and Levine go on to characterize the 
steady states of the dynamics. 
This type of model is very similar to the models that have been studied extensively 
in population genetics and evolutionary biology. 1 This similarity has led to a large
literature on the application of evolutionary biology to game theory. 2 In this paper
we assume that there is a large population. Each individual is matched anonymously to 
• This paper could not have been written without the help of Roko Aliprantis and especially Kim
Border. I would also like to thank for their help: Mahmoud El-Gama!, Richard McKelvey, Thomas 
Wolff. F inancial support as provided by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Fellowship and 
the Alfred P. Sloan Dissertation Fellowship and is duly appreciated. 
1 Appendix C contains a brief discussion of these models.
2See Boylan (1990) and references therein.
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exactly one other individual. There are m types of individuals. We keep the terminology
vague so that the model can be applied to economics (where types are beliefs), evolu­
tionary biology (where types are strategies), and to population genetics (where types are 
genotypes or alleles) .  The set of types is denoted by S, where 
The initial proportion of the population of type Sr is denoted by Pr; we assume throughout
that, for all Sr in S, Pr is positive. The initial distribution of types in the population is
denoted by p where p = (p1 , . . .  , Pm). Underlying the models we have mentioned is the
conjecture that if the population is very large (possibly infinite) there exists a matching 
scheme such that for all types Br and Bv the proportion of individuals of type Br 
that are matched with individuals of type Sv is PrPv (almost surely).
In this paper we further assume that the matching scheme is implemented infinitely 
often and each individual's type is allowed to change in between periods. Again, underly­ 
ing the models we mentioned is the conjecture that in every period the set of individuals 
adopting the same strategy is matched with the population average. This paper proves 
that there is a matching rule for which both conjectures are correct when individuals 
are represented by the set of natural numbers. Thus this paper answers the following 
questions that are usually left unanswered in the literature: How is the population char­ 
acterized? What is the structure of the matching process ? How are types assigned to 
individuals? What do we mean by each subpopulation facing the distribution of types 
equal to the population distribution? How do we characterize the evolution of the population 
from the random matching scheme? 
------<�1-tG-thefeJ'Hcl��ilmtion? How-00-we-Elt&a&t R-ze--the-e-v<>ltit±en-<>f-the--�----­
Section 2 gives an example of how the dynamics for very large populations differs
from the dynamics for infinite populations. Section 3 describes the problem of finding 
a matching technology for infinite populations such that all matches are equally likely. 
Section 4 proves the first conjecture. Sections 5 and 6 prove the second conjecture. Sec­
tion 7 examines a matching scheme for finite populations. Appendix A briefly discusses 
the literature on the law of large numbers for a continuum of agents. Appendix C gives 
a brief overview of the biological literature related to matching schemes. 
2 Matches over very large populations 
A natural argument for supporting the conjecture in the introduction is the following: if 
the population is of size n then the probability that the matching rule does not behave as 
its expectation is q(n). By the law of large numbers q(n) can be made arbitrarily small
by taking n large. In other words for large populations the conjecture is approximately 
correct. As we will see in Section 7 this argument can be formalized if the matching 
scheme occurs finitely many times. In many cases, however, the matching scheme ana­
lyzed occurs infinitely many times, and it is thus possible that the small perturbations 
that occur in each period alter the process significantly in the limit. We construct an 
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example where this problem actually occurs. The example is taken from evolutionary 
biology because: (i) such models are very important in evolutionary biology, (ii) several 
economists have applied evolutionary models to game theory, and (iii) the mathematics 
in this example are very tractable. 
Suppose that there is a population consisting of 3M individuals (where Mis an even 
number). Individuals have a very simple life: they are born at time t they interact with
one randomly selected individual, give birth to new individuals and die at time t + 1. The
matching scheme is left unspecified but we assume that all matches occur with positive 
probability. 3 Individuals belong to three different types: 1,2,3. If an individual of
type r interacts with an individual of type v then this individual has arv offsprings. All
off springs are of the same type as the parent. Suppose that the matrix A = ( avw ) is as
follows: 
A= ( � � � ) 
2 0 1 
First notice that the population size stays constant: if individuals of type sv and
Sw meet they will have together 2 = avw + awv offsprings and thus keep the population
constant. Notice that, because of the 0 entry in the matrix A, at any period t there is
a positive probability that one of the types disappears, which we denote by q!. For any
population distribution among types (Mi, M2, M3) (where M1 + M2 + M3 = 3M) there
exists a set of matches for which one of the types totally disappears. Since all matches 
are possible these matches will have positive probability. Denote the probability that one 
type disappears when the population distribution is (M1, M2, M3) by qM,,M,,M,. Let
Then, for all t, q! :'.'.: Qe > 0. 
Notice that if a type disappears it never comes back. Consequently, if the matching 
scheme is repeated infinitely often, the probability that a type will disappear is greater 
than 
1 - lim (l - qe)' = 1. t-oo 
Let B, be the set of events for which the trajectory attains one of the boundaries of 
the simplex by time t. From the previous remarks { Bt} is an increasing sequence and
lim,_00 P (B,) = l; therefore one of the types disappears in finite time. It is easy to see
that if type Sv disappears then the population will converge to a population composed
uniquely of individuals of type Sv+I (mod 3) (almost surely). Therefore the population will
converge to one of the vertices of the simplex in finite time (almost surely). Since this 
result is true irrespective of the population size 3M, it will also be true as M tends to
infinity. 
30ne way of describing the random matching scheme is to think of individnals as being drawn
successively (without replacement) from an urn. The first and second individuals drawn are matched
together, the third and fourth individuals drawn are matched together, and so on. 
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Let Pv be the proportion of the population of type Sv. In evolutionary biology the 
evolution for the population is analyzed according to the replicator model. The replicator 
model assumes that a proportion 2PvPw of the matches are between individuals of type 
Sv and Sw. Then the proportion of the population of type i at time t + 1 is related to the
population at time t in the following way:
t+l _ R ( ') _ t L p�arv Pr - r P = Pr " " p' a p' · L.. v L..w v vw w (1) 
F irst suppose that the initial population is composed of a third of each type. Then 
the population will remain at the barycenter contrary to the behavior of the population 
when we examined the random matching rule. 
Next suppose that the initial population is not distributed equally among each type. 
The interior of the simplex is invariant under the map R. Thus if a trajectory starts 
in the interior of the simplex it cannot reach the boundary in finite time. Also the 
vertices of the simplex are repellors for the dynamics on the interior of the simplex. Let 
W: ,6.3-> R be such that W(p) = -1-. Weising (1989) shows that W has a unique
P1P2P3 minimum at the barycenter and that along any trajectory W is strictly increasing. Thus 
the trajectory approaches the boundary of the simplex asymptotically. By looking at the 
law of motion we can see that the trajectory oscillates from a neighborhood of (1, 0, 0), 
to a neighborhood of (0, 1, 0), to a neighborhood of (0, 0, 1) and so on and that that the
time the trajectory takes to go from one neighborhood to another is increasing. Thus for 
-------<�-here is a period t > T stteh that p' is far removed from any of the veffi.ee<'c------­
and thew-limit (the set of accumulation points) of the trajectory is the whole boundary. 
3 Matches over countably infinite number of agents 
This section introduces the notation that will be used in this paper and discusses the 
problems of finding a random matching scheme for an infinite population. We assume 
that the population is countably infinite and is denoted by 
N={l,2, .. . ,n, . . .  }.
For convenience we represent the type space by the standard basis for Rm; i.e., Sr is them 
dimensional vector with a one on the r'h component and zeros on the other components. 
Let 
T 
a: N-> S be such that Jim � "L: a(i) = p.T-oo i=l
If a( i) = sv then individual i is of type Sv. The v'h component of the vector p, Pv,
represents the proportion of the population of type Sv. 
Let � be the set of all possible pairwise matchings; i.e., 
� = {<7:N-> NIO" is bijective and for all i, 0"2(i) = i and O"(i) � i}.
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A few remarks on the conditions that characterize E. The first condition says that each
individual is matched exactly once. The second condition says that: 'if John is matched 
with Paul then Paul is matched with John.' The third condition states that an individual 
cannot be matched to himself. 
We first show that there does not exist a probability space (E, F, P) such that for all
distinct players i, j, k E N, the event that player i is matched with player j and the event
that player i is matched with player k are equally likely. Suppose that (E, F, P) is such
a probability space. Denote the probability that player i is matched with player j by
p(a(i) = j) = P({a E Ela(i) = j}). 
In order for p to be well defined we need to assume that for all individuals i, j E N, 
{a E Ela(i) = j} E F. (2) 
Suppose that p(a(i) = j) = q > 0. Notice that since each individual is matched once,
the sets {a E El a(i) = j} and {a E El a(i) = k} are disjoint. Thus
p(a(i) EN)= p( LJ a(i) = j) = I: p(a(i) = j) = oo. 
This clearly contradicts the definition of a probability. Alternatively, if q = 0 then
p(a(i) EN) = 0 which is not consistent with the fact that individual i is matched once.
Clearly the assumption in equation 2 and the assumption that all matches are equally
likely lead to this contradiction. In order to weaken the set of measurable sets we need 
to find another way to express the idea that all matches are equally likely. Alternatively, 
we could relax the assumption that all matches are equally likely. 4 
4 Construction of a probability measure over matches 
In this section we will construct a probability space over the set of matches by considering 
the events:'the set of matches such that individual i is matched with an individual of type
sv' (Vi E N, Vs. E S) .  We construct the probability space in an indirect way. First we
define a probability over the space SN, which we call 'the set of realizations of matches.' 
The probability space (SN, B, µ) is defined by the property that the probability with
which X; (where x E sN, i E N) equals Sv is the proportion of individuals in the
population of type s., Pv (for all s. E S). Then we show that this probability space
generates a probability space over matches, (E, :F/,, P:;). Thus calling elements in SN
realizations of matches is justified since they can be derived from a probability over 
matches. This probability space is the (P:;) unique probability space for which each
indi·vidual expects to be matched with the population average. For this probability space 
4 Another approach is to assume that there is a continuum of agents. A brief discussion of this
approach is contained in Appendix A. 
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the set of events 'individual i is matched with individual j is not measurable.' If we let
these events be measurable, as in the probability space (L:, F);, P); ), then these event will
not be equally likely, although all individuals have the same probability of being matched 
with an individual that adopts strategy Sv (for all Sv E S).
We call SN the set of realizations of the matching process. Let x E SN. If x( i) =
Sr then individual i is matched with an individual of type s,. The description of the
relationship between L: and sN and the derivation of the probability space over L: are
the objects of this section. 
We consider each element in sN as the realization of an infinite sequence of i. i.d. 
random variables where the probability that x(i) equals Sv is Pv· If m = 6 and Pv = 1/6
(for v = 1, ... , 6) we can think of x as the outcome from rolling a dice infinitely many
times. Let (SN, B, µ) be the probability space we just described where B is the O'-algebra
constructed by the finite dimensional rectangles, and µ is the extension of the probability
over the finite dimensional rectangles. 5 For all types Sr, let Ir C N be the subset of the
population of type sr; i.e.,
I,(a) = {i E Nla(i) = s,} .
Notice that each set I,(a) is infinite. Let Xrv(a) C 5N be the set of realizations of
the matching process such that the proportion of individuals that are of type r and are 
matched with individuals of type vis PrPv; i.e.,
Then by the strong law of large numbers, µ( Xrv (a)) = 1. 6 Let Xa be the set of
realizations of the matching process such that for all s,, Sv E S, the proportion of in­
dividuals that are of type r and are matched with individuals of type v is PrPv; i.e.,
Xa = nr nv X,v(a). Notice that since Xrv is the finite intersection of sets of measure
one, µ(Xa) = 1. 
5Formally, a finite dimensional rectangle is a set of the form 
B = {x E XI x; EB; for all i in J} 
where J is a finite subset of N and for all i in J, B; is a subset of S. Let
µJ(B) =II ( L p,).
iEJ ,,EB; 
Let B be the O'-algebra generated by the finite dimensional rectangles. By Neveu (1965) Proposition
V.1.2 there exists a probability measure over (SN, B) such that for all ]-dimensional rectangles, B, 
µ(B) = µJ(B). 
6Let X; = a,( i)xv ( i). Then, { X;} is a sequence of independent random variables with finite vari­
ance, O';. Furthermore, L:;:1 'f,- < co, and thus by the Kolmogorov's law of large numbers (see for
instance Rao (1984) Theorem 6, page 60), limT-= � Li=! X; = PrPv (almost surely).
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For all x E Xa and for all types Sn Sv, let A;'.'v be the set of players of type Sr that are
matched with an individual of type sv; i.e.,
A�v = {i E NI a(i) = Sn x(i) = sv}· 
Notice that each of the sets A;:v has countably many elements and thus can be enumerated
as follows: 
A�v = {a�v(l),a�v(2), ... }. 
For any two different types Sr and Sv let
= 
{ a�r(i + 1)
arr(z - 1)
O"�(a�v(i)) = a�r(i). 
if i is odd,
if i is even;
Clearly O"� E E. 
Let O"a: Xa-+ E be such that O"a(x) = O"�. The function O"a is injective since a o O"� = 
x. 
Next we will construct two different probability spaces for matches. In the first 
probability space the events "individual i is matched with individual j" and "individual
i is matched with individual k" are not equally likely. The second probability space is
the coarsest measure for which each subpopulation Ir( a) is matched with the population
average. Notice that for this probability measure the event "individual i is matched with
individual j" are not measurable. 7 
Since O" a is injective, by identifying x and O"� we can construct a probability over
Ea = O"a(Xa)· Formally, let :Fa be the O"-algebra generated by O"a(B n Xa) and let
Pa = µ o 0";;-1. Then, (Ea, :Fa, Pa) is a probability measure.
We can extend this probability over all E by letting :F� be the O"-algebra generated 
by :Fcx and E \Ea and letting P;(A) = Pcx(A n Ea)·
Theorem 1 (E, :F�, P;) is a probability measure for which the event 
{ O" E EI <7( i) = j} is measurable. 
Proof: Let B[' be the event "i is the nth player selecting strategy a( i) and matched with
an individual adopting strategy a(j)." Let
N; = {k � ila(k) = a(i)}. Then
Bi= LJ {x E SNI x(i) = a(j), Vk
' E N', x(k') = a(j),
{ N'cN;l IN'l=n} 
and Vk" E N;\ N',x(k") # a(j) }.
7In Section 3 we showed that for a probability space over � either the events "individual i is matched 
with individual j" are not measurable or they are not equally likely. 
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Thus Bf is the finite union of rectangles and is thus measurable. Similarly, let Bj be the 
event "j is the n•h player selecting strategy a(j) and matched with an individual adopting 
strategy a( i)." Clearly, Bj is measurable. Let En = B[' n Bj and let B = UnSmln{i,j} En.
Clearly, En is measurable and x E B  if and only if aa(x)(i) = j. Therefore,
aa(B) ={a E El a(i) = j} E F�, 
and thus the event that individual i is matched with individual j is measurable. I 
Let ef>a:E-+ 5N be defined by ef>a( a) =a o a and let Ya= ef>a(E). Let (SN,B',µ')
be the completion of the measure space ( 5N, B, µ).
Lemma 1 Xa C Ya. Consequently, µ'(Ya)= 1 . 
Proof: Let x E X(a). Then aa(x) E E and ef>a(aa(x)) = 
Consequently, µ'(Ya) = 1 since Xa C Ya and µ'(Xa) = 1.
x. Therefore, x E Y (a). 
I 
The probability measure µ' is restricted over Ya by setting: 
Let Fa 2 be the a-algebra on E generated by q,-1(By) and let P; =µyo <f>a·
Theorem 2 (E, F�, P;) is a probability measure. 
Proof: Follows from the previous lemma, the fact that µ(Xa) = 1, and Proposition 2.12 
(page 21) in Breiman (1968). I
For either probability measure we have thus proven the following theorem. 
Theorem 3 Let Ir(a) be the subset of the population of type sr. Suppose that the pro­
portion of the population of type Sv is Pv. Suppose that people are matched at random 
according to the matching rule (E, Fa, Pa). Then the proportion of the population Ir( a)
that is matched with an individual of type Sv is Pv (almost surely). 
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5 Extension of the probability of the realizations of 
matches 
In the previous section we defined a probability over the set of realizations of the matching 
process. In order to do that we had to assume that the assignment of types, a, was such
that the Cesaro average converges; i.e., a E A where
A =  {a E SNJ lim T
l t a(i) exists and is strictly positive}. T-oo i=l 
In this section we dispense with this assumption; i.e., we define a probability over the 
realization of matches for all a E sN. This is done by means of a measurable extension
of the averaging which we denote by g. 
In order to prove the existence of a measurable extension we need both a topological 
and a measurable structure for sN. The space sN is endowed with the product topology; 
this makes sN a complete, separable, metric space 8 and (SN, B) a measurable space 
where B is the Borel er-algebra. 
Let G: SN_,, Rm be such that for all a E SN, G(a) is the lim sup of a; i.e.,
Tn 
G(a) ={a E RmJ3 {Tn}n such that lim ,}, �a(i) =a}.
n-oo -'-n £.....d i-1 
Notice that since { � L;f=t a( i) }TEN is an infinite sequence belonging to them-dimensional
simplex it has a convergent subsequence and thus G( a) is nonempty.
Lemma 2 The correspondence G is closed-valued and measurable. 
Proof : Fix a E SN, let {am}m be such that am E G(a) and am--> a. For all n E N, let
{ T,;"} n be such that 
ym 
lim T� f a(i) =am.n-oo n . i=l 
For each m EN, let n(m) be such that
T::(m) 
IJ� L a(i) - amJJ < 1/m and n(m) > n(m - 1).n(m) i=l 
80ne possible metric is d, where for all"• f3 E 5N, 
di" Ii)= \' . ia(i) - fJ(i)I ' " ' ,_, 2'(1 + la(i) - (J(i)I)'
;eN 
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1 rm Then it is each to check that limm-oo ym L;;\m) o:(i). Therefore, a E G(o:) and G(o:)n(m) 
is closed. 




= { O'. E sN I 3 {Tn}n such that J�� A L a( i) E F}
n n LJ Fr.nnEN TENT>T 
i=l 
T 
Fr.n - {a E SNI � L o:(i) E B(F, � )} and
i:;;:l 
B(F, �) {a E Rml :lb E F such that Ila - bll < � }.
Since for all T and n, Fr.n E B, c-1(F) EB and G is measurable.
Lemma 3 The correspondence G has a measurable selection g. 
I 
Proof: The Kuratowski-Ryll- Nordziewski Theorem (see for instance Theorem 14.2.1
in Klein and Thompson (1984)) states that any closed-valued measurable correspon­
------cle=�inW-a-separahle m'*ri£-�aGe--has--a-me-asmhle-selection�TJ111s-ihe__resul_Uolhw�-----
from Lemma 2. I 
Notice that for all a EA, g(o:) = limr�oo � LZ=I o:(i) and thus g is the extension we
are looking for. 
Let B be a finite measurable rectangle in SN; i.e,
B = {x E SNlx(i) EB; for all i in J}, 
where J C N is a finite set and for all i in J, B; C S. Then let µ(a, B) be the probability
that if the population selects strategies according to a, then for all i E J, individual i is
matched with an individual of type Bi; i.e.,
µ(a,B) = Il(:Z:: g,(a)).
The function µ(a,·) can clearly be extended so that (SN,B,µ(a,·)) is a probability
measure. 
Lemma 4 The function µ is a stochastic kernel. 
Proof : In order to cl1eck tl1e r1 easurability ofµ(·, B) it is sufficient to consider the case
where Bis a finite dimensional rectangle ( Neveu (1965), page 75). For this case, µ(·, B) 
is clearly a continuous function of g( a). Therefore, µ( ·, B) is a measurable function. I
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6 Repeated matching scheme 
In this section we define the notation to describe a population which is matched infinitely 
many times and in which after each period individuals' type may change. We extend the 
results of Section 4 for this context. 
Let r: S x S -> S be such that if at time t an individual of type Sv is matched with
an individual of type Sw then at time t + 1 the individual is of type r(sv, sw)· 9 10 In
order to guarantee that no type disappears immediately we assume that for all types s, 
there exist types Sv and Sw (where r, v, w can be equal) such that t(sv,sw) = s, ES. 
Let t:SN x SN-> A be such that for all i EN, x,a E SN, 
t(x, a)(i) = r(a(i), x(i)).11 
If at time t individual i is of type a( i) and is matched with an individual of type x( i) 
then, at time t + 1, individual i's type is t(a,x)(i). For all x E SN and for all a E SN, 
the functions t: SN x { x} -> SN and t: {a} X SN -> SN are continuous 12 (and thus
measurable) and hence and jointly measurable. 13 
Let Z = SN x SN and let C = 8 0 8. Let Q: Z x C -> [O, l] be such that for all
(a,x) E Zand all (B,B') EC, 
Q((a,x),(B,B')) = xs(t(a,x)) µ(t(a,x),B').14 
This law of motion includes the learning models and the evolutionary models with constant 
populations. 
10 A more general model would allow for a stochastic law of motion; i.e.,
r: S x S X [0, 1] __, S
where T is measurable and (S, P(S)) and ([O, 1], B([O, 1])) are measurable spaces (where P(S) is the 
power set and B(S) is the Borel O'-algebra). The map becomes stochastic after we define a probability 
measure over ([0, 1], B([O, l])). 
11If r is stochastic then t: SN x 5N x [O, l]N __,A is such that for all i EN, x, er E 5N, e E [O, l]N,
t(x,a,fl(i) = r(a(i),x(i),e;). 
12Suppose er" __, er and let m > 0. Then there exists an N such that for all n 2'. N and for all i $ m, 
er" ( i) = er( i). Thns for all n 2'. N and for all i $ m, t( er", x )( i) = t( a, x )( i). Therefore, t( a", x) __, t( er, x)
and t(., x) is continuous. The same proof shows that t(cr, ·) is continuous. 
13The proof that the continuity of each section implies joint measurability is in Appendix B. 
14For the case where T is stochastic let .\ be the Lebesgue measure over [O, l]N. For all a, x E 5N,
let Pa,• be the probability measure on (SN, B) defined by
Then, 
Q((a, x),(B,B')) = lµ(t,B')dPa,x(t). 
11 
Q ( (a, x ), (a', x')) is the probability that if at time t the population has types assigned
by a and is matched according to x, then at time t + 1 the population has types assigned
by a' and is matched according to x'.
Lemma 5 The function Q is a transition probability, i.e. , for each C E C, Q(-, C) is 
measurable and for each z E Z, Q(z, ·) is a probability measure. 
Proof: Fix z E Z. Then Q(z, ·) is the product of two probability measures and is thus a
probability. Fix C = (B, B') E C. Notice that Q(·, C) is the product of two measurable
functions oft and that t is a measurable function of z. Therefore, Q(-, C) is a measurable
function. I 
Theorem 4 There is a unique probability Q zo over ( Z, C) such that for every finite di­
mensional rectangle, C1 x · · · x CJ x�=J+i SN,
Proof: This follows from the Ionescu Tulcea theorem (see for instance Neveu (1965 ), 
Proposition V.1.1). I
For each a let Xcx be the set of realizations of the matching rule such that each
subpopulation is matched with the population average. By the results in Section 4, for 
all a EA, µ(a, Xcx) = 1. 
Lemma 6 The correspondence X: A__,, SN is measurable and closed valued. 
Proof: The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 2. I 
Lemma 7 The graph of X is measurable. 
Proof: Klein and Thompson (1984) prove (Proposition 13.2.2 and Proposition 13.2.4) 
that the graph of a closed measurable function is measurable. Thus this result follows 
directly from Lemma 6. I 
Theorem 5 Suppose that the inmat population types are described by a0 E A and is 
matched according to x0 E Xcxo. Then at every period each subpopulation is matched with 
the population average (almost surely). 
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Proof: Let C = graphX and let z EC. Clearly, Xt(z)(t(z)) = 1 and by the results in
Section 4, µ(t(z),Xt(z)) = 1. Then since t(z) EA we get that (t(z),Xt(z)) E graph X
and thus, 
Q(z,C) 2". Q(z,(t(z),Xt(z))) = Xt(z)(t(z))µ(t(z),Xt(z)) = l.15
Since for all z EC, Q(z, C) = 1, then for all JEN, 
Qz0[C x . .  · x C x:;'=J+l Z] = fc Q(zo, z1; dz,) . .  · fc Q(zJ-1, ZJ; dzJ) = 1.
I 
Since in each period each subpopulation is matched with the population average, 
given an initial population, a, we can compute the distribution of types at any given
period t, g'(a). Specifically, by letting
and we define recursively g'( a) by
v w 
Next we want to show that the probability Qz, is generated by some probability 
measure over the set of matches. 
Let ,P: EN x AN --t Z be such that
,P({o'i}, {a;}) = {(a; o O';, a;)}. 
Let Y = ,P(EN x AN) and let ( Z, C', Q') be the completion of the measure ( Z, C', Q zo). 
Using the same arguments as in Lemma 1 we can show that graph X C Y and thus
Q'(Y) = 1. The probability Q' is restricted over Y by setting
Let F be the O'-algebra generated by ,p-1(Cy) and let P = Qy o ,P. Using the same
argument as in Section 4 we get the following result. 
Theorem 6 (EN x AN,F,P) is a probability measure. 
15!n order to prove that Q( z, C) = 1 we had to show that C was measurable. An alternative way to
!'_roving the same res�lts is to show that the set C is thick (i.e., A EC, An C = 0 =} P(A) = 0) and thus
Q(x,C) = 1 where Q is the extension of Q over the trace O"-algebra C(C) such that Q(Anc) = Q(A)
(see Rao (1981), page 15, Theorem 5). 
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In many applications we will not be interested in the actual matches but only in the 
evolution of the population. Let v: SN x B ---> [O, 1] be such that for all a E SN and
BE B,
For all a, a' E SN, v( a, a') is the probability that if at time t the population's types
are described by a, then at time t + 1 the population's types are assigned by a'. 
Lemma 8 The function v is a transition probability; i.e., for each B E B, v(-, B) zs 
measurable and for each a E SN, v( a, · ) is a probability. 
Proof: This follows from Theorem 6.2 of Futia (1982). I 
- N -Let S = XnENS and B = ®nEN B.
Theorem 7 There is a unique probability Dao on (S, B) such that for every finite dimen­
sional rectangle, B1 x · · · x BJ x;;'=J+i SN,
Proof: This follows from the Ionescu Tulcea theorem
Proposition V.1.1). 
Proposition 1 If a0 EA then va0[AN] = 1.
(see for instance Neveu (1965), 
I 
Proof: Follows since we showed in Section 4 that v( a0, A) = 1. I 
7 The law of motion for finite populations and finite 
number of periods 
A justification of the analysis of the deterministic model for finite population is that we 
are just interested in following the law of motion for a finite number of periods, T. This
section proves that for a large enough population the model is approximately correct. 
Let p� be the proportion of individuals of type sv at time t. The initial proportion p0 
is given while the other proportions are computed by assuming that each t}'pe is matched
with the population average. For any type s, let { x�} be a sequence of random variables
such that (for all i and v) the probability that x� = Sv is Pv and let µ be the probability
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defined over the whole sequence of {x;} (as discussed in section 2.4). If the population
size is N the population is denoted by P(N), where P(N) = {1, ... , N}. For any period
t = 1, .. . T, let a': P(N) --+ S denote the assignment of strategies in the population. The
initial population a0 is given while the populations in the other periods are obtained by
the law of motion T (which is described in Section 2.6) and the matching rule. Individual 
are matched as in section 2.3; i.e., the individuals of type Sr that draw a random variable 
with value Sv are matched with the individuals of type Sv that draw a random variable 
with value Sr. Since these groups are finite we will not always be able to match all 
individuals this way. Thus the remaining individuals are matched in some arbitrary way. 
Theorem 8 For any T > 0, E > 0 and for any ii > 0 there exists a positive integer N' 
such that for all population sizes N > N' and all strategies Sv the following holds: with 
probability greater than 1 - ii the proportion of the population P( N) adopting strategy Sv 
at time T, k '£[';,,1 a� (i), is within E of p�.
Proof: The idea behind the proof is the following. We find a uniform upper bound (uni­
form over time period and strategy) for the proportion of the population which adopts 
a particular strategy at a time period and which is not matched according to the popu­
lation average (with probability 1 - q). The upper bound and q can be made arbitrarily
small by taking the population to be large enough. Then for almost all possible histories 
we can find a subpopulation which behaves exactly according to the deterministic model. 
Again the prop-ortion-of-the-p�iR-t��--=n-be-made arhitrari4'------­
close to one by taking the population to be large enough. 
Fix T > 0, E > 0, and fj > 0. Let � > 0 be such that (1 - � )2T > 1 - E, let
l!. = minv,t�T p;, and let N be greater than N' where
N' = Tf,2 ' .
48<2p3(1-- JT - � 
Let e" be the vector with 1 on the v'h component and zeros on the other components. 
Then { x� · e"}; is a sequence of Bernoulli random variables and thus if n is greater than 
n', where
then 
16Bernoulli's weak law of large numbers is proved (see Shiryayev (1984), page 47), by showing that if 
{x;} is a sequence of Bernoulli randoms variables with E(xi) = p then 
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Suppose that the number of individuals adopting any strategy Sr is greater than n and
the distribution of strategies in the population is given by p. Then, with probability 
greater than 1 - � , 
IPrPv - l{iEP(NJla(i)=r}I I:{iEP(N)la(i)=r}X�. e"I ( max < -
r,v PrPv � .
Consequently, with probability greater than 1-8 /T the proportion of individuals matched
according to the correct proportions is 1-z . But, with probability greater than 1- � , at
each period there are at least N E.(l - z )T > n' individuals adopting any strategy Sv and
thus a proportion 1 - z of the population is matched according to the population propor­
tion. Hence, with probability greater than 1- 8 at every period t = 1, . . .  , T- 1, there is
a (1 - z) proportion of the population which is matched according to the population pro­
portions. Define recursively P1 = { individuals matched with the population average },
P1 = { individual matched with subpopulation P,_1 average }. Hence with probability
1 - 8, 1;1 :'.'.: (1 - z )2T. Thus with probability 1 - 8 the population will be within
1 - ( 1 - z ) 2T < t of pT. I 
8 Conclusion 
Biologists and economists have analyzed populations where each individual interacts 
with randomly selected individuals. The random matching generates a very complicated 
stochastic system. Consequently biologists have approximated such a system by a de­
terministic system. The justification of such an approximation is that the population is 
assumed to be very large and thus some law of large numbers must hold. In the paper we 
give an example for which this assumption does not hold. This does not mean that this 
kind of approximation may never hold, but that the correctness of the approximation 
depends on properties of the law of motion. This paper shows that if we assume that the 
population is infinite then the stochastic and the deterministic system are the same. 
Note that all the proofs hold if the set of type, S, is countably infinite. In this case 
admissible proportions, p, must be such that: p > 0, I:,Es p, = 1, and lim,_00 p, = 0.
However, we are not aware of any study of such models. 
Finally, the matching technologies defined in the paper depend on the particular dis­
tribution of strategies in the population. It remains an open question whether matching 
schemes exist that are independent of the distribution of strategies and for which indi­
viduals are matched with individuals that adopt strategies in the same proportion as the 
population as a whole. 
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Appendix A:Populations with a continuum of agents 
This section follows Feldman and Gilles (1985). Suppose that the population is repre­
sented by the unit interval, I= (0, 1]. Let I denote the Lebesgue measurable sets of I 
and let .\ be the Lebesgue measure on I. The fact that the population selects strategies
according to x is represent by partitioning I as follows: 
Let B be the Borel sets of I. Let ( f!, F, P) be a probability space determined by the
randomized matching process. Let { X( ·, i)};EI be a family of random variables, where
for all i E I, X(-, i): f!-> {O, 1} is such that
p(X(·,i) = 1) =P({w:X(w,i) = 1}) =xr·
The event X(w, i) = 1 denotes that individual i is matched with an individual who selects
strategy r; X(w, i) = 0 denotes that individual i is matched with an individual who does
not select strategy r. Then in order for the conjecture given in the introduction to be 
correct to following needs to be true: for every B E B 
lsx(w,i)A(di) = xra(B). (3) 
For any sample w E n, define the set function Vw: B -> �+ by
vw(B) =ls X(w, i).\(di). 
Since Vw is absolutely continuous with respect to A, A � Vw, by the Radon-Nikodyn
theorem there exists a unique measurable function f such that 
vw(B) = ls f(a).\(da). ( 4) 
But if equation 3 holds then by setting f = Xr equation 4 is satisfied. Therefore since f 
is unique X(w, ·) = Xr (.\) a.e .. But since Xr if; {O, 1} this is not an admissible value for
X. Thus 3 cannot hold for all possible strategy partitions over the player set.
Green (1989) has shown that if the distribution of strategies in the population is
described by a different partitioning then the conjecture may hold. 
It still remains to be shown that there exists a probability space (f!, F, P) and a 
sequence of random variables {X(·, i)} which correspond to a random matching process
such that the conjecture holds. 
Finally, modeling a very large population as a countable set seems a better approxi­
mation than modeling it as a continuum. 
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Appendix B: Joint measurability of a function with 
continuous sections 
Theorem 9 Let ( X, B) be a measure space where X is a separable complete metric and
B is the Borel �-algebra. Let f: Xx X _. X be such that for all x EX, f: {x} x X _. X
and f: Xx {x} _. X are continuous. Then f is measurable.
Proof: Since X is a separable metric space, the Borel �-algebra B has a denumerable 
subfamily, D generating B (see for instance Parthasarathy (1967) Theorem 1.8). Let
Let 
D = {D1 , ... ,Dn, ... , }. 
:F" {F1 n F2 n · · · n Fnl where Fi = Di or Fi = X \Di}
_ {F;, ... , F,:: (n)}.
Notice that :Fn is a partition of X and that :Fn C B. For all i and n choose yf such that 
Yi E Ft. Finally, let
m(n) 
fn(x,y) = _L f(x,yf)XxxFi·
Notice that the continuity off. X r{c} =+ 7f easily i�e contim1ity of-th<41rnc"'ti,,o .. n----­
g: XX X _. X where g(x,y) = f(x,c). Thus fn(x,y) is a measurable function. Fix
y EX and for all n let i(n) be such that y E F[/n)" Notice that Fi/n) C Fi/;;�1) and that
F[(n) l {y }. Then,
lim fn(x,y) = lim J(x,yf(n)) = f(x, lim Yf(n)) = f(x,y).n-oo n--+oo n-oo 
The function f is hence the pointwise limit of a sequence of measurable functions and is 
thus measurable. I 
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A ppendix C: Brief review of Biology 
In this appendix we describe the relationship between the issues raised in this paper and 
models considered in population genetics and evolutionary biology. 
Population Genetics 
This section is based on Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer (1971). In the models we consider, 
the phenotype (e.g., eye color) is determined by the action of two genes at one locus. 
Genes are assumed to be of two types (alleles): A1 and A2• Individuals are of three types 
(genotypes): A1A1, A1A2, and A2A2. When two individuals mate they each produce 
gametes (reproductive cells). Gametes receive one of the parent's genes. An offspring 
is produced by the union of a gamete from each parent. When two individuals of types 
aa' and bb' mate they produce offsprings of type ab, ab', a'b, and a'b' with equal proba­
bility. Another assumption describes which individuals mate. "Matings take place at 
random with respect to the genetic differences being considered and in a pop­
ulation of infinite size" ( Cavalli-Sforza and Bodmer (1971), page 45). All individuals 
mate at the same time and then are completely replaced by their offsprings. Thus the 
dynamics of the process depends on the random matching of individuals and the random 
selection of genotypes for the offsprings. Suppose the initial relative frequency of alleles 
A, and A2 is P1 and p2 (p1 + P2 = 1 ). Then the Hardy-Weinberg theorem states that in
the next period the relative frequency of the genotypes A1A1, A1A2, A--i-A2 is respectively 
PI , 2p1p2, and p� . This theorem is 'proved' (just as in the original papers by Hardy
(1908) and Weinberg (1908)) by computing the expected proportion with which each 
of the matches occurs. No explicit modeling of the matching scheme and no derivation 
of a law of large numbers is given. Furthermore there seems to be some confusion in 
the literature about whether the population needs to be infinite or very large. Feller 
(1967) (page 135) writes: "In a large population the actually observed frequencies of the 
three genotypes in the filial generation will be close to the theoretical probabilities." And 
in a footnote at the end of this sentence: "The statements is made precise by the law 
of large numbers and the central limit theorem, which permit us to estimate the effect 
of chance fluctuations." Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) (page 9) write: "A few more 
premises were used implicitly in the derivation. For instance we equated "frequency" 
with "probability." This is admissible in the limiting case of very large populations." 
The model just described is generalized to the case where genotypes differ in fitness 
(the expected number of offsprings). Denote by w;; the fitness of the genotype A;;. If the 
initial relative frequency of alleles A1 and A2 is p1 and p2 then the next period frequency 





where d = WnPI + 2w12p1p2 + w22P� · 17 Then the frequency of alleles A1 in the next
17Notice that in genetics it is always assumed that Wij = Wji· 
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period is 
This model easily generalizes to the case where there are m alleles, A1, • . .  , Am. The law
of motion for the alleles is the same as equation 1 (where w;i = a;j)· This model has 
also been analyzed when the matches occur infinitely often; e.g., Fisher (1930) and more 
recently Losert and Akin (1983) analyze the properties of the limiting distributions of 
. l' t genotypes; 1.e., im,_00 p . 
The model just described is closely related to the model considered in this paper. The 
set of types in this model is the set of genotypes. For instance, in the case where there 
are only two alleles, 
S = {A1Ai, A1A2,A2A2}. 
The law of motion T in this model is stochastic; for instance 
Thus in order to prove the Hardy-Weinberg theorem in this context we need to generalize 
the model for stochastic laws of motions. 
The Hardy-Weinberg theorem and the law of motion in equation 1 can be derived 
from a different set of assumptions on the reproductive scheme. Individuals form a large 
number of gametes. A small proportion of the gametes formed unite with gametes of 
the opposite sex. Thus, the distribution of genotypes in the next generation is found 
by a sample of the gametes (and hence of the alleles) in the population. Specifically if 
the proportion of alleles A1 and A2 is respectively p1 and p2 then the next generation 
is obtained by drawing 2N gametes where we assume that the probability of drawing a
gamete of type A1 is p1 and the probability of drawing a gamete of type A2 is p2• Then 
the expected proportion of alleles of any type is given by equation 1 where p; is the 
proportion of alleles of type A; and a;i is the number of offsprings of a genotype A;Aj. 
Again no law of large numbers has been derived for this system. However, geneticists 
realize that the deterministic element of the model is due to the assumption of large 
population. 
The stochastic element created by small population is considered in the models of 
'random genetic drift.' Suppose that there are N individuals and that the population
size stays constant from generation to generation. If the population proportion of allele 
A1 is p1 then the next period population is formed by drawing 2N gametes from an
urn that contains a proportion p1 of gametes of type A1• This model is approximately 
correct if the number of gametes is large enough (and thus we can consider the sampling 
procedure as sampling with replacement). The binomial distribution gives the the gene 
frequency distribution after one period. Kimura (1964) derived the gene frequency 
distribution after n generations. At any generation the mean number of genes of type A1 
is p1 although eventually one of the alleles is fixed in all populations. The proportion of 
populations in which A1 is eventually fixed is p1. The probability of fixation at generation 
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t, P(t,p1), depends on the initial gene frequency, p1, and the population size, N. Kimura
( 1964) showed that
t 
P(t,p1) � 1- 6p1(l - p1)e-2 N
and Ewens (1969) computed the mean fixation time to be
4N[p1 logp1(1 - P1) log(l - P1)].
Thus this model underscores the difference between the expected gene frequency and the 
real gene frequency. 
Evolutionary Biology 
This section follows Maynard Smith (1982) (10-23). There is an infinite population of
individuals identical in all respects except for how they behave in a two-person contest. 
In this contest there are only two possible strategies: to act as a hawk (denoted by H) 
and to act as a dove (denote by D). Each individual is paired off at random with one
other individual. Individuals reproduce their kind asexually. The number of offspring 
for an individual that adopts strategy i and is matched with an individual that adopts
strategy j (i,j E {H, D}) is W0 + E(i, j). 18 If p is the frequency of individuals adopting
strategy H then it is asserted that the number of offsprings of individuals that select








E(i) = W0 + pE(i, H) + (1 - p)E(i, D) 
and that the frequency p' of individuals selection H in the next period is
I E(H) 
P = P pE(h) + (1 - p)E(D)
.
This model can clearly be generalized to the case where there are m strategies, s1, . . •  , Sm· 
The law of motion for this system is the one described in equation 1 where arv = Wo + 
E( s,, sv ). Again there seems to be some confusion as to whether the population is
assumed to be infinite or very large as in Hines (1987). 
Suppose that the population stays constant; i.e., arv + avr = 2. Then if we require
the number of individuals of each type to be nonnegative integers then for all strategies 
Sr and sv, avr E {O, 1, 2}. Thus the model described in Section 6 describes the replicator
model where 
( ) { Sv if avw f= 0 
T Sv, Sw = "f Q Sw l avw = · 
The results in this paper show that if the population is countably infinite then equation 1 
describes the behavior of the process (almost surely).
18If the parent lives more than one period the number of offsprings includes the parent. 
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